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Abstract— Security and energy are considered as the most 
important parameters for designing and building a computing 
system nowadays. Today’s attacks target different layers of 
the computing system (i.e. software and hardware). 
Introduction of new transistor technologies to the integrated 
circuits design is beneficial, especially for low energy 
requirements. The new devices have unique features and 
properties that provide security advantages. However, these 
properties may come to the aid of an adversary to design 
stronger attacks. Therefore, the advantages as well as the 
disadvantages of these technologies need to be well studied. 
This paper demonstrates the area and power efficiency of the 
tunnel field-effect transistor (TFET) technology along with 
analyzing its security aspects. 
Keywords— Hardware Security, Tunnel Field Effect 
Transistor, Advanced Encryption Standard, and FabScalar. 
I. INTRODUCTION
The ubiquitous connectivity among computing systems 
is increasing that causes significant growth in the amount of 
data to be processed, transmitted, and stored by these 
systems. This situation brings a proper environment for 
adversaries to exploit possible backdoors in software and/or 
hardware to perform malicious purposes. In this regard, 
security and energy are considered as the most important 
metrics for design of computing systems nowadays. 
Building a secure and low energy computing system 
requires multidisciplinary research across different system 
layers, including, application, algorithm, programming 
language, operating system and virtual machine, instruction 
set architecture, microarchitecture, register transfer level 
(RTL) and gate-level circuit, transistor-level circuit, 
transistor device, material and physics. In fact, it is very 
challenging to achieve a computing system immune to all 
the software- and hardware-based attacks with considering 
the strict constraints on energy, performance, functionality, 
area, and cost. 
Recently, new transistor technologies are introduced to 
the very large scale integration (VLSI) design for the sake 
of low energy consumption, especially due to the device 
scaling barriers of the CMOS technology. These 
technologies have unique features and properties that can 
provide security advantages. However, they present new 
manufacturing errors, fault models, and reliability issues. 
Also, their properties might come to the aid of an adversary 
to design stronger attacks. Therefore, the advantages as well 
as the disadvantages of these technologies need to be well 
studied. The contributions of this paper can be stated as: 
demonstrating the area and power efficiency of the tunnel 
field-effect transistor (TFET) technology, in Section 2; and 
security analysis of the TFET device, in Section 3. The 
paper is concluded in Section 4. 
II. AREA AND POWER EFFICIENCY OF TUNNEL FIELD-
EFFECT TRANSISTOR 
The traditional MOSFET with the ideal 60 mV/dec sub-
threshold slope is no longer qualified for the near/sub- 
threshold computing (NSTC) regime. Due to the fact that 
the MOSFET current switching process works based on the 
temperature-dependent injection of electrons over an energy 
barrier, the transition slope steepness cannot be further 
scaled. According to the formulas for the ON and OFF 
currents of the MOSFET device [1], the threshold voltage 
(Vt) may not be scaled by squared two due to its 
exponential relationship with the OFF current. On the other 
hand, the overdrive parameter (VGate-Source - Vt) should 
be sufficient enough to achieve a high ON current. These 
cause noticeable decelerated scaling of both threshold 
voltage and supply voltage. A novel inter-band tunneling 
transistor named, Tunnel FET has been introduced to 
provide steeper sub-threshold slope (i.e. smaller than 60 
mV/dec) [2]. The TFET device can be described as a gated 
p-i-n (i.e. the hole-dominant region, the intrinsic (pure)
region, and the electron-dominant region) diode that has
asymmetrical doping structure and operates under reverse-
bias condition. It is turned ON by tunneling at the source-
channel (p-i) junction through controlling the gate voltage.
Figure 1 demonstrates the TFET lateral device structure.
The steeper sub-threshold slope of the TFET device helps
to further down scale the supply voltage and reduce the
leakage currents substantially, which makes it an excellent
candidate to achieve low energy consumption for the IoT
applications. The comparison between the drain- source
current (IDS) versus gate-source voltage (VGS) curves of the
n-type TFET and the n-type MOSFET is shown in Figure 2.
In this simulation, the InAs homo-junction TFET model
from [3] is used with having these device parameters: gate
width and length of 20 nm, body thickness of 5 nm,
dielectric thickness of 5 nm, source doping of 4 x 1019 cm3,
drain doping of 6 x 1017 cm3, Si FinFET S/D doping of 1 x
1020 cm3. For simulating the MOSFET behavior, the
CMOS 20 nm Predictive Technology Model (PTM) - Multi
Gate (MG) [4] is employed. Also, both devices are
connected to the supply voltage of 0.6 V. As it can be seen
from the figure, the TFET device turns ON and goes to its
saturation region at a smaller value of the gate-source
voltage in compare to the MOSFET device.
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Fig. 1. TFET device lateral structure. 
 
Comparison of N-Type MOSFET and N-Type TFET Operations 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 2. The comparison between the drain-source current versus gate-
source voltage curves of the n-type MOSFET and the n-type TFET. 
 
It has been demonstrated that the TFET device has 
unique and unconventional features and properties that can 
be beneficial for all parameters of the VLSI design, such as 
power and security [5]. In here, the area and the average 
power consumption of different versions of a moderated 
Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) cryptographic 
processor [6], including its S-Box engine, a 32-Bit KATAN 
cryptographic hardware [7], and a canonical superscalar 
processing core are analyzed in both CMOS and TFET 
technologies. All these modules (except the processing 
core) are implemented in both static logic (SL) and current 
mode logic (CML) [8]. According to the CML style, the 
current bias transistor operates in its saturation region that 
causes providing constant current and consequently power 
consumption. This feature makes the CML style a good 
candidate for implementation of cryptographic processors 
to have high defense strength in front of power-based side 
channel attacks [9]—[11]. 
For the AES hardware, we can have a 128-bit data block 
along with 128-bit, 192-bit, or 256-bit key. This algorithm 
is symmetric that means the same key is used for both 
encryption and decryption. The primary inputs of this 
algorithm is the plain-text or state (i.e. a 4 x 4 column major 
order matrix of bytes) and the encryption/decryption key, 
and the primary output is the cipher-text. A plain-text is 
transformed to ciphertext after going through a number of 
transformation rounds. The typical number of 
transformation rounds is equal to six in addition to the key-
length divided by 32. The KATAN hardware receives 32-
bit and 80-bit plain-text and key respectively as its inputs. 
According to its structure, there are two linear feedback 
shift registers in parallel, with the sizes of 13-bit and 19-bit. 
These two registers go through two AND- and/or XOR-
based computing functions for 254 iterations until the final 
cipher-text is generated. The selected processing core, 
Core-1 is generated by FabScalar tool suite [12], which is 
used to quickly design and generate the super-scale 
processors in a canonical template. The employed 
instruction set architecture (ISA) in this tool suite is a 
derivative of MIPS [13] without having load and branch 
delay slots. The canonical template consists of ten pipeline 
stages, namely, Fetch, Decode, Rename, Dispatch, Issue, 
Reg Read, Execute, Load/Store Unit, Writeback, and 
Retire. 
The SPICE-level implementation of all these modules 
(i.e. the SPICE-based netlists) are simulated using the 
Synopsys CustomSim FastSPICE simulator. The duration 
time for transient simulation and analysis of the netlists for 
the cryptographic modules is 2560 ns and the average 
current is extracted using one data pattern for the period of 
7 ns. The supply voltage is set to 0.6 V and 0.3 V in the 
CMOS-based and the TFET-based netlists respectively. The 
area of each module is calculated from the available data in 
the SPICE-based libraries, and its absolute value of average 
power consumption is obtained from the simulation data. 
With considering the S- Box engine as the reference 
module, its static logic implementation has the area and the 
absolute value of average power consumption of 4,484,160 
(nm2) and 0.2385 (pW) for CMOS technology, and 
3,271,600 (nm2) and 0.046371 (pW) for TFET technology. 
In the CML style, they are 7,470,144 (nm2) and 789.78 
(pW) for CMOS technology, and 5,391,880 (nm2) and 
47.976 (pW) for TFET technology. The proportional 
achieved area and average power consumption results from 
implementation of different versions of the AES processor 
are shown in Table I. All of the implemented AES 
processors have only one transformation round. For the 
super-scale processor, the duration time for transient 
analysis of its netlists is 2560 ns and the average current is 
extracted using one data pattern for the period of 500 ns 
(except for the TFET-based Load/Store Unit pipeline stage 
that is 100ns). The supply voltage is set to 0.6 V and 0.3 V 
in the CMOS-based and the TFET-based netlists 
respectively. Table II represents the analysis results for the 
super-scale processor. Meanwhile, the behavioral modules 
of performance simulation, random access memories, 
content addressable memories, and caches are ignored 
during hardware simulation. From the presented results in 
these two tables, it is interpreted that the TFET technology 
can provide less power consumption and area possession. 
 
    CMOS-based SL  CMOS-based CML  TFET-based SL  TFET-based CML 
Area  Power  Area  Power  Area  Power  Area  Power 
1    1.1479  22.4046  0.2762  0.2155  1.0934  12.5229  0.2882  0.2032 
2    1.6650  0.2287  2.5042  2.8063  1.6728  0.2991  2.3635  2.8421 
3    2.0016  2.0000  2.0045  2.0072  2.0016  1.9367  2.0048  2.0083 
4    3.9984  4.0000  3.9955  3.9928  3.9984  3.8889  3.9952  3.9925 
5    9.0048  9.5869  22.1232  36.7691  9.2912  9.5941  22.4184  25.7896 
TABLE I 
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE CRYPTOGRAPHIC PROCESSORS 
USING CMOS AND TFET TECHNOLOGIES 
 
KATAN 
S െ Box 
AES 16 െ Bit 
KATAN 
AES 32 െ Bit 
AES 16 െ Bit 
AES 64 െ Bit 
AES 16 െ Bit 
AES 128 െ Bit 
AES 16 െ Bit 
P - Type Region N - Type Region Intrinsic  Channel 
Dielectric 
Dielectric 
Gate 
Gate 
Source Drain 
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Pipeline 
Stage  Module Name 
CMOS 20 nm  TFET 20 nm 
Logic Cells 
Area (ߤ݉2)  Average Power Consumption (ߤܹ)  Logic Cells Area (ߤ݉2) 
Average Power 
Consumption 
(ߤܹ) 
Fetch  FetchStage1  68.093568  131.353392  49.276800  5.5168698 Fetch1Fetch2  21.466944  16.2561738  15.587600  1.94987697 
FetchStage2  107.395200  98.530692  77.658400  6.1629327 
Fetch2Decode  29.586816  292.787688  21.461600  9.0212262 
Decode  Decode  102.881664  1947.47616  80.756800  46.526547 InstructionBuffer  0.679104  20.4963192  0.558000  0.44968962 
InstBufRename  25.652160  19.3739484  18.626800  2.33282073 
Rename  Rename  4.928256  79.675686  3.787200  2.06143578 
RenameDispatch  29.329344  22.2438078  21.297200  2.67418698 
Dispatch  Dispatch  3.312576  4.4663382  2.399600  0.097017309 
Issue  IssueQueue  87.561216  963.66756  63.084800  28.3487073 
IssueqRegRead  28.209600  29.7913626  20.482800  2.75909943 
Reg. Read  RegRead  27.015552  3.72484254  19.574400  0.51231588 
RegReadExecute  29.229120  30.554955  21.222800  2.85142134 
Execute  Execute  225.548928  1127.57052  189.281600  19.7540151 
AgenLsu  5.581440  4.19726772  4.052800  0.5046876 
Load/Store 
Unit  LoadStoreUnit  328.352832  1060.89852  243.137200  38.602338 
Write-back  WriteBack  14.176512  27.5420892  10.289600  1.64981388 
Retire  ActiveList  3.656448  7.5163338  2.636000  0.45154854 
ArchMapTable  1.340928  13.8324762  1.092800  0.259969746 
TABLE II 
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE FABSCALAR PROCESSOR USING 
CMOS AND TFET TECHNOLOGIES 
 
III. SECURITY ANALYSIS OF TUNNEL FIELD-EFFECT 
TRANSISTOR 
Even though hardware implementation of cryptographic 
algorithms can provide higher performance and speed, it 
might leak some physical information (e.g. current and 
delay) to be used for sensitive data extraction. Correlation 
power analysis (CPA) can be used as an attack on 
cryptographic systems to discover the relationship between 
the theoretical power data (extracted from the Hamming 
Weight model) and the actual power data (measured using 
the SPICE simulation). There is perfect relationship 
between the data variables if the correlation value is +/ 
−1.0, and there is no correlation if it is 0. The true 
theoretical power signal (i.e. correctly guessed key) brings 
remarkable spikes (especially close to +/ −1.0) in the 
corresponding correlation coefficient signal. Also, if the 
true signal along with the false signals show remarkable 
spikes in a scattered form, or their average amplitudes are 
close to +/ − 1.0, an attacker cannot find the correct key 
easily. Equation 1 is used for calculation of the correlation 
coefficient value. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
      4 Number of 16-Byte Plaintexts (in Hexadecimal)     
03  F4  5A  49  50  DF  5B  D1  22  1A  0E  23  C9  85  10  39 
0D  28  33  84  12  B9  0A  2F  B1  BE  D1  73  41  D5  DD  F9 
03  11  E4  16  D5  02  C3  FA  C2  44  5E  17  47  4A  1C  EB 
05  35  39  20  3F  A8  4E  96  C9  17  43  98  31  82  EB  B4 
      16 Number of 1-Byte Keys (in Hexadecimal)     
DE  36  97  F3  70  88  17  1E  E2  0E  0D  6C  12  2A  F5  C8 
TABLE III 
THE FOUR 128-BIT PLAIN-TEXTS AND SIXTEEN 8-BIT KEYS. 
 
In this paper, the S-Box engine of the AES cryptographic 
processor, implemented in static logic and current mode 
logic styles using CMOS and TFET technologies, is used 
for analysis. Four 128-bit plain-texts and sixteen 8-bit keys 
are chosen randomly to be entered to the engine, shown in 
Table III. The analysis is run for 10 ns with the time step of 
5 ps, and its outcome can be observed in Figures 3 and 4. 
As it is shown, leveraging the TFET device provides more 
scattered correct and false correlation coefficient signals 
that lead to higher hardness in finding the correct key and 
consequently attaining a more resilient AES processor. 
Also, the current mode logic style smooths the correlation 
coefficient signals (i.e. having very small variations) that 
makes the process of guessing keys even harder. However, 
there are still minor variations in the signals that are 
possible to be a source of security crack. An example is 
shown in Figure 5. 
 
Comparison of Correlation Coefficients in Static Logic 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 3. The comparison of the correlation analysis on the simulation 
power signal and the theoretical power signal in the CMOS-based static 
logic style (top) and the TFET-based static logic style (bottom). 
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Comparison of Correlation Coefficients in Current Mode Logic 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 4. The comparison of the correlation analysis on the simulation 
power signal and the theoretical power signal in the CMOS-based CML 
style (top) and the TFET-based CML style (bottom). 
 
Correlation Coefficient Signal for TFET-Based CML Style 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 5. An example of a correlation coefficient signal for the TFET-
based CML style. 
 
The unique features and properties of the TFET 
technology may have disadvantages and come to the aid of 
an attacker. In this regard, the footprints of two 
performance degradative hardware Trojans (i.e. a malicious 
modification to the hardware) on the area and the average 
power consumption of a canonical super-scale processing 
core are analyzed in both CMOS and TFET technologies. 
The FabScalar Core-1 [12] is employed for this experiment. 
One of the Trojans is inserted in the branch predictor 
module of the Fetch pipeline stage. The Fetch stage is used 
for selecting and translating an instruction address. The 
branch predictor has the duty of guessing the correct path of 
a branch instruction in order to improve the speed of 
instruction execution flow and consequently processor 
performance. Its prediction mechanism works based on a 
branch history table that includes two 2-bit saturating 
counters. The Trojan payload is altering these four bits and 
is activated according to a clock-triggered counter. The 
second Trojan is placed in the instruction buffer module of 
the Decode pipeline stage. The Decode stage interprets and 
decodes the selected instruction to its composition 
operations. The instruction buffer module reduces the 
instruction cache and/or main memory accesses, latency, 
and energy through preserving the repetitive instructions. 
Either reaching a counter state or a conditional state can 
activate the Trojan. Its payload is wrong enabling the stall 
signal that causes re-fetch of an instruction from the 
instruction cache (or the main memory). 
The SPICE-level implementation of the healthy and 
infected modules (i.e. the SPICE-based netlists) are 
simulated using the Synopsys CustomSim FastSPICE 
simulator. The duration time for transient simulation and 
analysis of these netlists is 2560 ns and the average current 
is extracted using one data pattern for the period of 500 ns. 
The supply voltage is set to 0.6 V and 0.3 V in the CMOS-
based and the TFET-based netlists respectively. In order to 
evaluate the processor performance before and after the 
malicious modifications, the SPEC2000 integer benchmarks 
are run on it for 100 million SimPoints. As it was 
mentioned in Section 2, the area and the absolute value of 
average power consumption are computed. Table IV 
demonstrates the analysis and evaluation results. As it can 
be observed from the results, the inserted Trojans degrade 
the processor performance noticeably. Using the TFET 
technology makes the Trojans to be less detectable with 
respect to the area occupation. It might help an attacker by 
causing smaller changes in the average power consumption 
depending on the number and type (i.e. combinational or 
sequential) of the logic cells used in hardware synthesis. 
Meanwhile, the caused overheads by the Trojans on the 
area and the average power consumption of the whole 
processor are relatively negligible. 
 
Module 
Name 
Instruction Per Cycle Degradation (%)  Logic Cells Area Change (%)  Average Power Consumption Change (%) 
bzip  gap  gzip  mcf  parser  vortex  CMOS 20nm 
PTM-MG 
TFET 
20nm 
InAs 
CMOS 
20nm 
PTM-MG 
TFET 
20nm 
InAs 
Malicious 
Branch 
Prediction  34.83  30.43  20.00  57.76  35.71  44.16  1.34  1.30  20.91  14.44 
Malicious 
Instruction 
Buffer  77.53  75.36  72.31  81.03  78.57  74.03  1.84  1.82  17.02  36.92 
TABLE IV 
THE FOOTPRINTS OF TWO PERFORMANCE DEGRADATIVE 
HARDWARE TROJANS ON THE AREA AND THE AVERAGE 
POWER CONSUMPTION OF A PROCESSOR IN CMOS AND TFET 
TECHNOLOGIES. 
 
IV. CONCLUSIONS 
In this paper, the tunnel field-effect transistor is analyzed 
from area, power, and security perspectives. The area and 
the average power consumption of different versions of a 
moderated AES cryptographic processor, a 32-Bit KATAN 
cryptographic hardware, and a canonical super-scale 
processing core are calculated. The results show that the 
TFET device provides area and power efficiency. Two 
cases are studied for security analysis: (1) the S-Box engine 
of the AES cryptographic processor, implemented in static 
logic and current mode logic styles, is attacked by 
correlation power analysis. The TFET device coupled with 
the CML style brings more scattered correct and false 
correlation coefficient signals that leads to higher hardness 
in finding the correct key and consequently attaining a more 
resilient AES processor. (2) the footprints of two 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 0.8188 
0.819 
0.8192 
0.8194 
0.8196 
0.8198 
0.82 
0.8202 
Time (ns) 
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performance degradative hardware Trojans on the area and 
the average power consumption of a canonical superscalar 
processing core are analyzed. The outcome represents less 
detectability of the TFET-based hardware Trojans. 
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